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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Foreign direct investment has been increasing rapidly throughout most of the world. A 
significant part of foreign direct investment is in horizontally-integrated activities (where these 
activities could be production of an intermediate or a final good, or a service); and a large part of 
international trade now consists of internal transactions between units of multinational firms 
(MNFs) located in  different countries. For example, almost 40% of United States imports and 
exports in 1984 were between U. S. firms and their foreign affiliates/parents (see Little, 1987); 
approximately half of cars sold by Honda Motor Company in the U. S. are now built in the U. S. 
; there has been a phenomenal growth in multinational banking, insurance and other financial 
services recently; and many resource-extracting or resource-based industries like crude-oil or 
petroleum products are  often "multinational" in character. Also, a large number of foreign 
subsidiaries are not wholly owned by the MNFs; and many home countries defer home taxation 
of non- repatriated foreign profits. 
 Foreign direct investment has recently been analyzed in the literature using both partial 
and general equilibrium models of the multinational firm.1 These models invariably assume or 
conclude that if the MNF undertakes internal real transactions, it is because of real cost 
differences. However, intrafirm trade can itself be used by the MNF as an 'international conveyor  
of profits.2  Then, factors like minority local ownership of the foreign subsidiary or deferral from 
home taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits can themselves induce the MNF to engage in 
internal real transactions. 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine real implications  of the two factors mentioned 
above; i.e., whether minority ownership and/or deferral lead the MNF to export intrafirm from 
the higher cost country. Its Section 2 presents the model, defines minority local ownership and 
examines the implications of foreign tax credit and deferral provisions for the effective statutory 
tax rate on profits earned in the foreign country. In Section 3 we analyze whether intrafirm trade 
is perverse (i.e. originating from the higher marginal cost country) when the home country 
permits deferral from home taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits. Section 4 presents 
different results when either deferral is not permitted or it is not in the MNF's interest to defer 
repatriation of its foreign profits. Section 5 examines how the introduction of tariffs changes the 
results given in the previous two sections, and compares quotas to tariffs. General implications of 
the results are presented in Section 6. 
2.  THE MODEL 
 Consider an MNF producing and selling a product in two countries. This product may be 
any of the following: a final good, an intermediate good, a service. It also exports part of its 
output from its unit in one country to that in the other. We permit intrafirm trade in either 
direction, i.e. the MNF's exporting unit could either be in the home country (country l ) or in the 
foreign country (country 2). The technology which makes such strategy optimum will be 
described below. The MNF has market power in the two countries, and the industry in which it 
operates has non-insignificant barriers to entry. We wish to examine the real implications of 
internal real transactions in the presence of minority foreign ownership and/or deferral. 
 Let πi, ti, si, xi, Ri (si), Ci (xi), ri, ci, and c1i represent gross pure profits, statutory profit tax 
rate, sales, output, total revenue and total cost functions, marginal revenue and marginal cost 
functions and slope of the marginal cost function, respectively, in country i, and let Ti (1 - ti), 
where i = 1, 2.3 First consider that the MNF exports a part of output of its unit in the home 
country - called the parent firm - to its subsidiary in the foreign country. Then, 
            π1 = R1(s1) – C1(s1 + m) + pm ,       (1) 
 π2 = R2(s2) – C2(s2 - m) – pm ,                        (2) 
where m are the MNF's imports into country 2 from country 1 and p is the transfer pries. Clearly, 
x1 = s1 + m, and x2 = s2 - m. Assume s2 > m > 0.  
 These  individual  pure  profit  functions  are  restated  below  for  internal  real 
transactions flowing in the other direction.   Let m´  represent amount of the foreign subsidiary's 
output which is now exported intrafirm to the parent firm. Then, x1 = s1 - mʹ, x2 = s2 + mʹ, s1 > mʹ 
> 0 ( by assumption ) and 
 π1 = R1(s1) – C1(s1 - m') - pm' ,                                                                       (1')                                                          
 π2 = R2(s2) – C2(s2 + m') + pm' ,                                                           (2')   
Note that ( l ' ) and ( 2') can alternatively be obtained by substituting m = - m'  in ( 1 ) and ( 2). 
Minority Ownership 
 Consider minority local ownership of the subsidiary. This could be due to foreign 
ownership restrictions (in at least some sectors  or industries ) imposed by most countries. Some 
of the more prominent of these countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela. See 
Coopers and Lybrand ( 1993). Minority local ownership has been introduced by Kant ( 1988b 
and 1990) by a straight forward extension of the earlier MNF models. Let k be the proportion of 
the foreign subsidiary owned by the MNF, and assume  
 1/2 < k ≤1.  
The lower limit on k is imposed so that the MNF has full control over its foreign subsidiary: and 
the MNF owns its foreign subsidiary fully when k = 14. 
Foreign Tax Credit Scheme with Deferral 
 Under deferral, profits of a subsidiary are taxed by the home country only when such 
profits are repatriated to home. Then, under the foreign tax credit scheme (assumed in this 
paper), the effective statutory rate on repatriated foreign profits is equal to sum of the two 
countries' statutory profit tax rates minus the foreign tax credit given by the home country. This 
is so because the home country taxes the repatriated foreign profits at its tax rate but gives a tax 
credit for foreign taxes paid. The rate at which the tax credit is given is the smaller of the two 
statutory tax rates.  
 Note that the effective statutory rate and the statutory rate are the same for home profits. 
Let te2 represent the effective statutory profit tax rate levied on pure profits earned in country 2. 
We wish to relate the magnitude of te2 to those of the statutory tax rates, ti.  First consider some 
non-repatriation.  The MNF gains by not repatriating any part of its foreign profits only if t1 > t2. 
Let q represent the proportion of foreign profits repatriated, where 0 ≤ q < 1. The home tax on 
repatriated profit is then t2qπ2 and the foreign tax credit received is t2qπ2   Clearly, 
te2 = t2 + t1q — t2q = t2l , where  
 
t2l =  t2 + (t1 - t2)q                                                     (3) 
 Now consider following two situations concurrently. Consider either that t1 ≤ t2 (so that 
the MNF does not gain by not repatriating its foreign profits fully), or t1 > t2 but the home 
country does not permit  deferral from home taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits.  In either 
case, for 
 t1 ≥ t2, t
e
2 = (t1 + t2) – t2 = t1,  and for                         (4) 
 
 t1 < t2, t
e
2
 = (t1 + t2) – t1 = t2,                                                             (5) 
 
To summarize, we have the following three cases: (A) t1 > t2 and non-full repatriation (i.e., q <  
1). Then, te2 =  t2l; (B) t1 ≥  t2 and either full repatriation (for t1 = t2) or non- deferral from home 
taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits (for t1 > t2). In that case, t
e
2 =  tl ; and (C) t1 < t2 where 
te2 =  t2. Case (A) is discussed in the following section. On the other hand, different results for the 
other two cases are presented in Section 4. 
3.  t1 > t2 WITH DEFERRAL 
 First the case of minority foreign ownership of the subsidiary and then that of full 
ownership by the MNF over its foreign subsidiary are discussed. 
A.  Minority Local Ownership 
Let π represent the MNF's global net profit function.  Then, 
     π = T1 π1 + T21k π2 , where                                                               (6) 
     T21 = (1 -  t21) = (1 -  t1) + (t1 - t2)(1 - q) > 0 .                                                       (7) 
 
 Consider first that the direction of intrafirm trade is from the parent firm to the foreign 
subsidiary so that the two individual profit functions are defined by (1) and (2), respectively.  
Then, the partial derivative of π with respect to p is 
      πp = (T1 - T21k)m = Tm where T = (T1 – T21k)               (8) 
But T can also be stated as : 
       T = (1 - t1 )(1 - k) - k(t1  - t2 ) (1 - q) .                 (9) 
The two terms on the right hand side of (9) are respectively positive and negative, and the sign of 
T is indeterminate. Assume it to be non-zero.  First consider the T  > 0 case. An increase in p 
increases the parent firm's (the subsidiary's) export revenues (import costs). But, only the k-
proportion of the subsidiary's import costs are borne by the MNF [with (1 - k) proportion borne 
by local shareholders in the foreign country], while the export revenues accrue wholly to the 
parent firm. Therefore, an increase in p transfers pure profits from local shareholders in the 
foreign country to the parent firm. This positive effect - called the minority local ownership 
effect - is captured by the first term on the right hand side of (9). On the other hand, ( t1 - t2)( 1 -
q)k measures the global profit tax savings by the MNF due to non-full repatriation of its share of 
foreign profit. An increase in p, by decreasing π2, reduces this tax-saving effect and hence 
decreases π. This negative effect-called the deferral effect-is measured by the [- k( t1 - t2 )( 1 - q)] 
term in (9). 
 When T < 0, a decrease in p decreases the parent firm's (the subsidiary's) export revenues 
(import costs). By analogous  reasoning as above, the minority local ownership effect now means 
a shift of pure profits from the parent firm to local shareholders in the foreign country. The 
deferral effect is now interpreted as follows: a decrease in p, by increasing π2, increases the tax 
savings effect of not repatriating π2 fully to the home country, and hence increases π. 
 Clearly. in the case of a positive ( negative) T, the  minority local ownership effect 
dominates ( is dominated by ) the deferral effect. If there were no prospect of a transfer pricing 
penalty, in the former ( latter) case the MNF would be interested in increasing (decreasing) its 
transfer price as much as possible. Following Kant ( l988a). consider now that the MNF faces the 
prospect of imposition of a penalty where the probability. α, of the penalty depends on the 
transfer price declared by it. Assume that the government  has a guideline that the transfer  price  
should be equal  to the arm's length price,  p̂.  If the MNF charges  p̂ there is no threat of the 
penalty, and α = 0.  If it does not charge the arm's length price, a transfer pricing penalty can he 
imposed on it; i.e. in that case α is positive.  
 The probability of imposition of the penalty depends on the divergence between the 
transfer price charged and ,the arm 's length price, i.e.,  α = α ( p – p̂).   Let p, be the transfer 
price which triggers the transfer pricing penalty with certainty, i.e. where α = 1. As p gets closer 
to pe, the probability of promulgation of the penalty increases, and assume it increases at an 
increasing rate. Thus, for increase in the transfer price (ITP) case, 
              for p̂ <  p  < pe , 0 < α ( p -p̂) < 1, α'( p - p̂) > 0, α’’ (p - p̂) >0,                (10) 
 while for decrease in the transfer price ( DTP) case, 
            for p̂ > p >pe ,0 < α(p - p̂) <1, αʹ(p - p̂) > 0, αn(p - p̂)>0              (11) 
 
Clearly, 
 sign α'( p - p̂ ) = sign T.       (12)5 
Let ζ > 0 represent the transfer pricing penalty. Then. the expected loss due to the penalty is: 
 ζα(p - p̂) + 0.[1 – α(p - p̂)] =  ζα(p - p̂) > 0.      (13) 
Therefore,  the  objective  function  of  the  MNF, ϕ .  and  the  first-order  condition  with 
respect to p are: 
ϕ= π —ζα(p - p̂) , and             (14) 
 
ϕp= Tm — ζα´(p - p̂) = 0             (15) 
 
The last equation differs from similar equations in other MNF models in showing that the 
derivative of the MNF’s objective function with respect to p does not have the same sign for all 
permissible values of p. Clearly. the MNF may not find it optimal to charge the corner or the 
limiting transfer price. In the T > 0 case. the first term on the right hand side of ( 15 ) is positive, 
and the MNF has incentive to increase its transfer price. But, an increase in the transfer price also 
increases the probability of the transfer pricing penalty. This negative effect on ϕ is measured by 
the [ - ζα(p -  p̂)] term in (15). Only if the  former effect  dominates  the  latter  for all  
permissible  values of  p, will the optimum transfer price be the corner or the limiting transfer  
price.  But, due to the increasing probability  of  the  penalty  ( which  increases  at  an  
increasing  rate), the more likely outcome is that the optimum transfer price is in the interior,  
i.e., between p̂ and pe. 
 Similarly, for the DTP case. Hirshleifer  ( 1957 )  proved  that  the  arm's  length. price,   
p̂ equals c1.  Thus, in the ITP ( DTP) case, the MNF's optimum transfer price, p. is greater (less) 
than the exporting country's marginal cost.  Thus, 
 sign ( p - c1 )  = sign T.        (16) 
 Now. analyze the first-order condition with respect to intrafirm trade. Call intrafirm trade 
efficient if the two marginal costs arc equal in equilibrium.  On the other hand, term  it perverse  
(restricted) if the MNF's profits arc maximized at a level of  internal  transactions    such  that  
the  exporting  unit   has  the  higher  ( lower)  marginal . cost.   Whether  intrafirm  trade  is  
efficient.  perverse  or  restricted  is examined  below  by stating the partial derivative of ϕ with  
respect  to m as:  
          ϕm = (p - c1)T -T21(c1 - c2)k,           (17)6 
while the second order (sufficient) condition with respect to m  is: 
          ϕmm  =  - T1c1 - T21kc2 < 0 .            (18) 
 If  differences in  production functions  and input-rentals in  the  two  countries are allowed, then 
(18) requires that long-run marginal costs must be increasing at equilibrium in at least one 
country. Thus, one set of necessary and sufficient conditions under which the MNF will find it 
optimum to horizontally integrate in the two countries and undertake intrafirm trade is that the 
home country has decreasing or constant costs (increasing or constant returns to scale) at 
equilibrium, the foreign country has increasing costs (decreasing returns to scale), and the k-
proportion of after-tax rate of increase in marginal cost in the foreign country is greater than the 
after-tax rate of decrease (if any) in marginal cost in the home country. 
 On the other hand, if production functions and input-rentals are identical in the two 
countries, then (18) rules out increasing or constant returns to scale (decreasing or constant costs) 
at equilibrium in both the countries. Helpman (1984) and Markusen ( 1984) assume that inputs 
like R & D, advertising, marketing, distribution, management, finance and organization used in 
one plant or facility serve at zero marginal cost additional plants/facilities, and thereby give rise 
to increasing returns to scale. This assumption is likely to be quite valid for R & D. But inputs 
like advertising,. marketing, distribution, management, finance and organization cannot serve 
additional plant/facility located in a possibly distant country (with likely different language, 
culture, legal system and industrial relations) at zero marginal cost.7 Further, if all stages of 
production before final sale (in particular, if transportation and retailing costs) are included, 
decreasing returns to scale (increasing costs) from "production" (as interpreted above) of a 
product/variety from a single facility globally are also quite likely.8,9 
 Now we analyze equation (17). Consider again the ITP case first. In view of (16), both 
increase in the transfer price and internal real transactions shift profits from the foreign to the 
home country [and the first term in (17) is unambiguously positive]. Therefore, lower marginal 
cost in the exporting country, i.e. a negative (c1 - c2 ), is not a necessary condition (although it is 
a sufficient condition) for the MNF to export from there (for  ɸm to be positive initially), and the 
MNF finds such trade profitable even if c1 - c2   Further, a necessary condition for the MNF to 
achieve its trading equilibrium is: 
  (c1 - c2) = (p - c1)T /T21k,        (17') 
that is, only if internal real transactions are perverse. In the ITP case being discussed, the 
minority local ownership effect dominates the deferral effect. Clearly, in this case, minority local 
ownership over the subsidiary encourages intrafirm trade (by either increasing home production 
or decreasing foreign production or both) beyond the efficient level. Exporting from country 1 
wastes real resources while, at the same time, increasing the global profit tax burden on the 
MNF. But the shift of pure profits from local shareholders in the foreign country through 
intrafirm trade more than compensates the MNF for both these negative effects. Lastly, the 
higher are the transfer price and the proportion, q, of foreign profits repatriated, and the lower are 
the proportion, k, of the foreign subsidiary owned by the MNF, and the statutory profit tax rate 
differential, (t1 - t2 ), the greater is the extent of perverse internal real transactions. 
 Consider now the negative T case. As shown above, in this case .the MNF''s optimum 
transfer price is smaller than c1. and results similar to the ITP case follow. In this case, both 
decrease in the transfer price and intrafirm trade [by creating negative net export revenue, (p - 
c1), in the home country] shift profits from the home to the foreign country. But, the gain due to 
deferral from home taxation at the higher home rate of profits shifted to the foreign country 
dominates both the resulting shift of pure profits to foreign shareholders and the increased 
overall production costs. Further, the lower are the transfer price and q, and the higher are k and 
(t1 - t2), the greater is the extent of perverse intrafirm trade. 
 Now consider that internal real transactions are in the other direction, i.e. from the 
foreign subsidiary to the parent firm, In that case, the expression for the MNF's global net profit 
function remains the same as (6). But, the individual pure profit functions, π1 and π2, in (6) are 
now defined by (l') and (2'), respectively [rather than by (1) and (2) as earlier].  The partial  
derivative of π with respect to p is now: 
 πp = - (T1 - T21 k )m' = - Tm' = T 'm', where     (8') 
 T´ = - T.          (19) 
 If T' is positive, i.e., if T is negative and the deferral effect is greater than the minority local 
ownership effect, the MNF increases its transfer price on its exports (now) from the foreign 
subsidiary so as to shift profits to the foreign country. Vice versa when T' is negative. The 
definition and properties of the probability of penalty  function,  the  expression  of  the  
objective function  and  the first  order conditions with respect to s1 and s2 are the same as before. 
The expression and the analysis for ϕp is similar with T 'm' replacing Tm. The arm's length price 
now equals c2, and 
 sign ( p - c2 )  = sign T’ .       (16') 
Further, 
  ϕm' = - ϕm and ϕmm'  = ϕmm'      (20) 
and the discussion in the two paragraphs following (18) still holds. Lastly, restate   ϕm' as: 
 ϕmʹ = (p - c2)Tʹ - T1(c2 - c1),      (21) 
so that at the trading equilibrium, 
 (c2 - c1) = (p - c2)Tʹ / T1        (21') 
Similar conclusions as above about perverse internal real  transactions  hold. Exporting intrafirm 
from country 2 wastes real resources. But, in  the ITP case, reduction in the MNF's global profit 
tax burden due to shift of profits to the lower- tax foreign country more than compensates the 
MNF both for the higher overall production costs and the shift of profits from the parent firm to 
foreign local shareholders. Vice versa in the  DTP case. Further, in the  ITP ( DTP) case, the 
higher (lower) are p, k and (t1  - t2); and the lower (higher) is q, the greater is the extent of 
perverse intrafirm trade. 
 It may be noted that the parent firm need not be wholly owned by the MNF. Similar 
results follow when the MNF does not own the parent firm fully but its controlling owners own a 
greater share of the parent firm than of the subsidiary. Then, the following proposition  
summarizes the above discussion: 
PROPOSITION  1: (A)  When the MNF defers repatriation  of ( some or all of) its foreign  profit  
and  when its controlling  owners own a greater share of the parent firm  than of the foreign  
subsidiary, lower marginal cost in the exporting country is not a necessary condition for  the 
MNF to undertake internal real transactions, and its profits  are maximized  only  if the  
exporting  country  has  the  higher  marginal cost. 
 (B) Further, in the ITP case, when the home [foreign ] country is the exporting country, 
the higher are the transfer price and q [and k and (t1 – t2)], and the lower are k and (t1 - t2 ) 
[is q], the greater is the extent of perverse intrafirm trade. On the other hand, in the DTP case, 
when exports originate from the home  [foreign ]   country, the extent of the perverse  internal 
real transactions is  greater the lower are the transfer price  and q [and k and ( t1  - t2) ],  and 
higher are k and (t1 - t2 )  [is q].
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B.  Whole Ownership of the Foreign Subsidiary: 
 Consider now that the foreign subsidiary is wholly-owned by the MNF (with t1 > t2 and 
deferral).  In that case, k = l, the minority foreign ownership effect vanishes and T is clearly 
negative. When the parent firm (foreign subsidiary) is the exporting unit, the MNF is now only 
interested in decreasing (increasing) its transfer price. In either case, profits are shifted to the 
lower tax foreign country. 
 The conclusions about perverse intrafirm trade stated in Proposition 1A hold even if, as 
now, the extent of ownership by the controlling owners in the two units of the MNF is the same 
(except that now internal real transactions shift profits within the MNF only rather than also 
from/to foreign shareholders). Proposition  lB is modified as follows: when exports originate 
from the home (foreign) country the extent of the perverse intrafirm trade is greater the lower 
(higher) is the transfer price, the lower is q, and the higher is ( t1 - t2). 
 As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider that U.K. permits deferral from its 
taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits, and British Petroleum exports petroleum products to 
its fully-owned subsidiary in lower-tax  Singapore.  Under  these conditions, British Petroleum 
decreases the transfer price (on this internal trade), pure profits are shifted to Singapore, and 
marginal cost of production is higher in U.K. at equilibrium. Clearly, gain due to deferral from 
U.K.'s taxation of profits shifted to Singapore through intrafirm trade compensates British 
Petroleum for exporting intrafirm from its higher marginal cost unit. 
4.  CASES WITHOUT DEFERRAL 
 This  section presents  different  results  for the  other two  cases.  These are: (B) te2 = t1 
which results when t1 ≥ t2 and either the MNF repatriates its foreign profits to the home country 
fully (for t1 = t2 ) or the home country does not permit deferral from home taxation of non-
repatriated foreign profits  (for t1 > t2 );   and (C) t
e
2 = t2  which occurs when t1 < t2  Give a wider 
meaning to q:  let q now represent the proportion of foreign profits taxable at home (whether 
repatriated or not).  Clearly, q = 1 for both  (B) and (C). 
A.  Case  t1 ≥ t2 with No Deferral 
 In this case, the effective statutory profit tax rate equals t1 for profits earned in either 
country. Now the deferral effect vanishes. Equate q = 1 and substitute t1 for t21 in various 
expressions in Section 3. When the foreign subsidiary has minority local ownership, T equals (1 - 
t1) (1 - k), and is unambiguously positive. In that case, when the exporting unit is the parent firm 
(foreign subsidiary), the MNF increases (decreases) its transfer price to a level higher (lower) 
than the marginal cost in the home (foreign) country. Now, the shift of pure profits to the MNF 
from foreign shareholders (irrespective of the direction of intrafirm trade) more than 
compensates the MNF for exporting from the higher marginal cost country; and the lower is k, 
the greater is the extent of the perverse intrafirm trade. 
 For example, consider that the profit tax rates in Germany and France are equal; . and 
Siemens, Germany exports air-traffic management systems to its not-wholly owned subsidiary in 
France. Then, Siemens increases its transfer price; and the shift of pure profits from local 
shareholders in France through intrafirm trade more than compensates Siemens for exporting 
from its higher marginal cost German unit. 
 On the other hand, when the foreign subsidiary is wholly owned by the MNF, the foreign 
local ownership effect also disappears, T equals zero, and the MNF would have no reason to 
engage in transfer pricing. In fact, in view of the probability of the penalty function with positive 
expected value, it chooses the arm's length transfer price, p̂. Further, irrespective of the direction 
of internal real transactions, marginal cost must be lower for such exports to originate in a 
country, and the MNF achieves its optimum only if the two marginal costs are equal; i.e., only if 
intrafirm trade is efficient. 
 The last conclusion, and those from Section 3.B above can now be combined. The last 
paragraph above shows that internal real transactions are efficient when k = q = 1; while Section 
3.B demonstrates that deferral (with k = 1) results in perverse intrafirm trade. Thus, we can state: 
PROPOSITION 2: Consider that the foreign subsidiary is wholly-owned by the MNF. Then, 
permitting deferral from home taxation of non-repatriated foreign profits changes the nature of 
intrafirm trade from efficient to perverse. 
B. Case  t1 <  t2 
 In this case, we substitute t2 for t21 while, as before, we equate q to 1. Again, when  
exports originate from the home (foreign) country, the MNF only increases (decreases) its 
transfer price, and profits are shifted to the home country in either case. Proposition 1A continues 
to hold and is, in fact, strengthened because now global profit tax savings (since the home 
country has the lower tax rate) also compensate the MNF for exporting from the higher marginal 
cost unit. In addition, we have that the greater is (t2 - t1), and the lower is k, the greater is the 
extent of the perverse internal real transactions. Lastly, even if the foreign subsidiary is wholly 
owned by the MNF (and there is no deferral), we have perverse intrafirm trade. 
 As an example, consider the export of cars by Ford, U.S.A. to, say, its wholly- owned 
subsidiary in the higher-tax U.K. Ford increases its transfer price; and perverse internal real 
transactions are explained by the shift of pure profit from Ford's wholly-owned unit in U.K. to 
Ford, U.S.A. 
 Box 1 below summarizes the conclusions about perverse intrafirm trade. 
  
t1 ≥  t1 
 
 
t1 < t2 
 (q = l) 
 
Deferral 
 
 
No Deferral (q = 1) 
 
Minority Ownership 
 
 
Perverse 
 
Perverse 
 
Perverse 
 
Whole Ownership 
 
 
Perverse 
 
Efficient 
 
Perverse 
 
Box 1. Nature of Intrafirm Trade 
We also have the following generalization of Proposition IA; and state Proposition 3 (which is 
somewhat similar to Proposition 1B): 
PROPOSITION 1A': The MNF need not have lower marginal cost in the exporting country to 
export intrafirm ( it finds internal real transactions profitable even if the two marginal costs are 
equal),  and it achieves its maximum profits  only when the exporting country has the higher 
marginal cost.  The only exception to these results is when  t1 ≥ t2 , the foreign  subsidiary is 
wholly owned by the MNF and the home country  does  not permit  deferral from   home  
taxation  of  non-repatriated foreign profits. 
PROPOSITION 3: The extent of perverse internal transactions is greater, the greater the 
optimum transfer price diverges from the marginal cost in the exporting country. When t1 ≥ t2, 0 
≤ q < 1 and k = 1, this extent is greater the lower is the proportion, q, of foreign profits 
repatriated by the MNF, and the higher is (t1 - t2). When q = 1 and 1/2 < k < 1. it is greater the 
lower is the proportion, k, of the foreign subsidiary owned by the MNF. Lastly, when t2 > t1, it is 
greater the greater is (t2 - t1). 
5.  TARIFFS AND QUOTAS 
 Consider now tariffs and quotas as policies to counteract perverse intrafirm trade.  First 
consider tariffs. Then compare quotas to tariffs. To give a motivation for introducing tariffs in 
our model, we first show. the effect of tariffs both when the foreign subsidiary is wholly owned 
by the MNF and either there is full repatriation or there is no deferral, i.e., k = q = 1. First 
consider t1 ≥ t2 . Recall in this case te2 = t1 For the case of exports originating from the parent 
firm, we have 
  π* = T1[R1(s1) - C1(s1 + m) + R2(s2) - C2(s2 - m) – pmτ ],  (22) 
where π is the MNF's global net profit function under the stated conditions and τ is 
the ad valorem tariff rate on imports in country 2. The MNF decreases its transfer price so as to 
save on tariff payments. The definition and properties of the probability of the penalty function 
remain unchanged. Let ϕ represent the objective function under these conditions. Then, 
 ϕ*m = T1[(c2 – c1) – pτ].       (23) 
 Similar expression can be derived when exports go from the foreign subsidiary to the parent 
firm and the home country has a tariff on imports. In either case, the exporting country must 
have lower marginal cost both for the MNF to export from there, and at the trading equilibrium 
(i.e., we have restricted internal real transactions). Clearly, restricted intrafirm trade is smaller 
than efficient intrafirm trade. This suggests that imposition of tariffs in a situation of perverse 
internal real transactions (i.e. when the volume of intrafirm trade is greater than the '"efficient" 
level) may eliminate such perverse trade. This is analyzed below first for the deferral case and 
then for the cases without deferral. 
t1 > t2 with Deferral 
 Let πτ represent the MNF's global net profit function in the presence of all of the 
following:  tariffs,  minority  foreign  ownership  and  deferral  provisions. Define τ* = ( 1 + τ), 
and redefine gross profits in country 2 as: 
             πτ2 = R2(s2) - C2(s2 - m) - p τ*m . Then,                 (2") 
 πτ = T1π1 + T2lkπτ2 ,        (6́) 
 πτp = (T – T2lkτ)m = (T1 - T2lkτ*)m,      (8́́́́ ́) 
where T is defined by (9) above.  From (7) , 
 T2l = (l - t2l) = T1 + (t1 - t2)(l - q) > T1, 
(since t1 > t2). Then, from (8"), the MNF decreases its transfer price when kτ* is either greater 
than or equal to one. When it is smaller, its. exact transfer pricing strategy is ambiguous. The 
objective function is now termed ϕτ, and its partial derivative with respect to m can be stated as: 
 ϕτm = (T1 – T2lkτ*)(p – c1) – T2l(c1τ* - c2)k .                                 (17') 
Similar expression  can be derived when internal real transactions are in the other· direction and 
the home country has a tariff on imports.. Irrespective of the direction of intrafirm trade,  for both 
the ITP and the DTP cases, a positive  sign of this partial derivative has no implications for the 
signs of both (c1τ* -c2) and (c1 - c2): in spite of tariffs, intrafirm trade may be perverse. Identical 
conclusions hold for the trading equilibrium. 
Cases Without Deferral 
 Conditions for ITP and DTP are different in these cases.  In case (B),   te2 = t1 and the 
equation corresponding to (8") is: 
 πτp = T1[(l – k) – kτ]m = T1(1 – kτ*)m      (8'") 
(1 - k) in (8"') gives the effect of minority foreign ownership on πτ (and is positive) while (- kτ) 
gives that of tariffs (and is negative). If the former effect is greater (smaller) than the absolute 
value of the latter, i.e. k τ* is smaller (greater) than 1, the MNF increases (decreases) its transfer 
price.  
 In case (C),  te2 = t2 ;  and the partial derivative of πτ with respect to p, obtained by 
replacing T21 by T2 in equation (8"), is: 
 πτp = (T1 – T2kτ*)m                           (8'"') 
Now, the MNF increases its transfer price when kτ* is either less than or equal to one. When it is 
greater, it may either increase or decrease its p.  
 However, conclusions about perverse internal real transactions in both cases (B) and (C) - 
i.e., when q = 1 - are identical to those presented for the deferral with tariffs case above. Then, 
we have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4: The imposition of tariffs on intrafirm imports by one unit of the MNF from 
the other can lead to the restoration of efficient internal real transactions from the initial 
situation of where they are perverse 
 Now we compare import quotas to tariffs. Although the effect of an import quota on the 
volume of intrafirm trade, and on whether efficient internal real transactions are restored, is the 
same as that of tariffs, the following considerations make quotas an inferior policy. First consider 
who gets the quota rents. If quota rights are given away to importers  or if  they are auctioned, 
then importers or the importing country's government, respectively. get the quota rents. But, if 
they are given away to the exporting country [as under the widely prevalent voluntary export 
restraint ( VER) agreements], then quota rents accrue to exporters. In that case, import quotas are 
more costly to the importing country than equivalent tariffs. 
 Further, in our  model, the unit in the importing country has market power. Under such 
situation, as shown by Bhagwati (1965), this unit will charge higher prices and produce less 
under quota protection than under tariff protection. Lastly. tariffs are easier to administer than 
quotas, lead to less corruption.  lobbying and chasing of the valuable quota rents and act at the 
source of this perverse intrafirm trade.11 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 We  have  shown above that  permitting deferral  from  home taxation  of non- repatriated  
foreign profits changes the nature of internal  real  transactions from efficient to perverse even 
when the foreign subsidiary is fully-owned by the MNF. Further, if the foreign subsidiary has 
minority local ownership and the MNF engages in transfer pricing, its intrafirm exports are 
always from the country with the higher marginal cost.12 Since most tax codes have deferral 
provisions. and since less than wholly-owned subsidiaries constitute a large and increasing 
proportion of total MNF activities, perverse intrafirm trade cannot be ignored. 
 Ethier (1986) has recently suggested that internalization is the only one of the three key 
elements-ownership advantages, locational considerations and internalization of international 
transactions - explaining foreign direct investment not already incorporated into trade theory. 
This paper suggests that shifting pure profits from local portfolio equity investors in the foreign 
country or adopting overall tax-minimisation strategies can themselves be powerful motives for 
undertaking internal transactions; and it draws real implications of such internal transactions. 
Helleiner and Lavergne (1979) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) pose the question (but do not 
provide an answer) whether intrafirm trade differs significantly from that between unrelated 
buyers and sellers. This paper gives an affirmative answer to that question. 
 This paper also points out some policy dilemmas for governments in the world populated 
by MNF's. We have shown that tariffs can restore efficient intrafirm trade from a situation where 
it is perverse otherwise; and stated why tariffs are superior to quotas. An alternative could be to 
ensure that the MNF always charges a transfer price equal to the arm's length price. Although 
success in forcing the transfer price to equal the marginal cost of the exporting unit. eliminates 
perverse internal real transactions, such success will be difficult to achieve: it is very hard for 
governments to determine the arm's length price. For example, the U.S. has one of the most 
stringent regulations (Section 482 of the tax code ) on transfer pricing. Still. the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service is fighting a losing battle to enforce compliance with these regulations.13 
 Lastly, although our discussion has been in terms of a multinational firm. the part of our 
analysis above pertaining to less than wholly owned subsidiary applies to any ( purely ) domestic 
firm which has two or more units with the controlling owners having a greater ownership in one 
unit than the other.  With  the  recent surge of mergers and acquisitions i n many countries. there 
are likely to be considerable incentives to engage in internal transactions which violate real cost 
advantages. 
  
END NOTES 
 1See Horst (1971), Katrak (1977 and 1980), Eden (1978), Batra and Hadar (1979), Batra 
and Ramachandran ( 1980), Itagaki (1981), Markusen (1984), Helpman (1984), Ethier (1986), 
Kant (I988a and I 988b), Horstmann and Markusen ( 1987 and 1989), Ethier and Horn ( 1990), 
Stoughton and Talmor (forthcoming) and Gresik and Nelson (forthcoming). Most of these 
models consider or allow for an horizontally-integrated MNF 
 2The terms "internal real transactions" and "intrafirm trade" are used interchangeably in 
this paper. 
 3It is worth emphasizing  that pure profits here means total revenue  minus total cost 
(including opportunity cost of owned capital) minus normal profits in the respective country. 
Further. we assume that accelerated capital cost recovery allowances. investment tax credits. 
other deductions or exemptions. and reduced tax rates or outright subsidies granted for particular 
activities or regions in most tax codes make the taxable profits approximately equal to pure 
profits so that the statutory profit tax rate is levied and realized on pure profits. 
 4This paper does not go into the bargaining problem between local minority shareholders 
and the parent firm. For an analysis of this problem. see Stoughton and Talmor (forthcoming). 
Lee ( 1990) and Miyagiwa ( 1992) also examine the effects of foreign shareholding. But. their 
model assumes foreign equity investment to be portfolio rather than direct so that either 
country’s firm maximizes its own profit function rather than the joint or the global profit 
function. 
  5The formulation of the probability of penalty function is general. and it may apply to 
either country. Similarly, it is assumed that either due to international convention or otherwise, 
both the countries adopt the same definition of arm's length price. 
 6The first order conditions with respect to s1 and s2 give the  familiar  condition  that 
marginal cost equals marginal revenue in each country. A change in m first changes c1. To 
maintain marginal cost and marginal revenue equality s1 must change. Further, m also affects the 
first term on the right hand side of (15), and hence p; and from ( 17 ), p also affects m. Thus. m, 
s1, s2, and p are all determined simultaneously. 
  7Markusen (1984) recognizes that increasing returns to scale may be weak, and horizontal 
integration takes place due to factor-intensity differences. 
 8Trade theory generally considers transport costs and tariffs together as if they have 
identical effects on comparative advantage. But marginal tariff costs remain constant while 
marginal transport costs are likely to increase as a single product/variety of a product is 
transported· to ever farther consuming centers. In addition, retailing costs are incurred at 
numerous final sale points distributed all over the globe; and are likely to be significantly 
positive in non-purely competitive markets. Then, transport and retailing costs can be considered 
as natural barriers to increasing returns to scale of "producing" a product/variety from a single 
plant/facility globally. 
 9Horstmann and Markusen ( 1989) also use transportation/tariff costs to explain 
horizontal integration. In addition, Ethier and Horn ( 1990) suggest that increasing costs of 
"managerial control", and possibly increasing costs of interfacing with host country with 
different language, culture, legal system and industrial relations can lead to horizontal 
integration. 
 10Although the model presented above envisages the production of only one good 
(whether final or intermediate) of service, identical results follow if the MNF produces both the 
intermediate and the final good or the service and engages  in internal real transaction of the 
product which is produced in both the countries; except that when both the intermediate and the 
final good are produced in both the countries and the final good is exported intrafirm, for the 
MNF to achieve its optimum, the composite marginal cost (i.e. the sum of marginal costs of 
producing the intermediate and the final good) must be higher in the exporting country. 
 11Tariffs act at the source of  perverse intrafirm trade in the following way: perverse 
intrafirm trade arises because the MNF's internal real transactions shift pure profits from either 
the foreign shareholders or the higher tax foreign country. or. under deferral from home taxation 
of non-repatriated foreign profit. from the higher tax home country. Due to any one (or more) of 
these gains. intrafirm trade is increased beyond  the efficient level. The increase in the MNF's 
portion of costs in the importing country due to tariffs counter-acts all these gains to the MNF. 
Lastly. a subsidy on such exports worsens perverse intrafirm trade because it expands intrafirm 
exports further beyond the efficient level. 
 12These results imply that linkages between domestic costs and direction of intrafirm 
trade breakdown either when the MNF operates under deferral provisions. or it does not fully 
own its foreign subsidiary: and conclusions drawn on the assumption of a fully owned subsidiary 
or the absence of profit tax differentials cannot be assumed to extend to the world of subsidiaries 
with minority foreign ownership or of profit lax differentials.  
 13See Goldberg ( 1990) and Heck (1990). 
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